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key function of the regulator in a 
liberalized market sector is 
preserving competition, and since 
the UK energy market privatized in the late 
90’s this has been a continuous point of 
investigation.  The UK domestic retail 
energy market circa 2009 was, by several 
metrics, competitive on paper. By 2008 over 
75% of customers - approximately 20M 
households - had switched energy supplier 
at least once, and 83% of the remainder 
were aware that it was possible to switch 
[1]. Where most authorities considered 
switching rates to be a measure of 
competition in the market, the UK had the 
highest switching rate in Europe and 
amongst any sizeable competitive energy 
market in the world [2]. 
 
However, when exposed to further scrutiny, 
these statistics revealed a demonstrably 
uncompetitive environment – the 
consequences of which were realized over 
the next five years. First, it was found that 
only a third of customers switching suppliers 
did so as a result of making their own 
enquiries rather than in response to being 
approached by a salesperson [3]. At this 
time, doorstep selling of energy tariffs was 
widely practiced, but was affiliated with 
serious complaints. Chief amongst these was 
the claim of misleading sales tactics, as 
nearly half of electricity customers who 
switched as a result of direct sales ended up 
with higher bills [4]. This finding was just 
one of many statistics that gave evidence 
for the high levels of consumer distrust and 
low levels of consumer satisfaction with 
energy companies. By 2013, the problem 
had exacerbated to the point where nearly 
half of customers distrusted energy 
suppliers to be open and transparent with 
their dealings with consumers [5]. For such 
a major industry, this was unacceptable.  
 
In 2009, 18% of customers switched their 
electricity supplier [2]. By 2013 only 12% 
of customers were switching, turning the 
expectation that consumers would leave 
suppliers if they weren’t satisfied on its 
head [6]. With such rampant dissatisfaction 
in the market, why then weren’t customers 
exercising their ability to switch energy 
suppliers? The conclusion reached by the 
regulator was that despite the 
dissatisfaction, many consumers felt that the 
work required to find and switch to a better 
plan was not worth the effort, and that some 
consumers felt that they ran the risk of 
selecting an even worse tariff if they were 
to switch. In addition to the lack of trust and 
poor supplier conduct regarding customer 
acquisition, a large number of tariffs had 
become available on the market, many of 
which had complex arrangements and 
discount structures [5]. Consumers found it 
difficult and time consuming to find 
sufficient, straightforward information to 
make an informed decision about switching, 
causing many to refrain altogether [5]. One 
State of the Market report by the energy 
regulator Office of Gas & Electricity 
Markets (Ofgem) noted: “Combined with 
confusion and a lack of trust in the 
information available, many are left 
uncertain as to whether or not it will be 
beneficial to switch... Many consumers 
doubt that switching could lead to the kind 
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of benefit (financial savings and/or improved 
customer service) that would justify their 
time and effort and the risk that things could 
go wrong”[5]. 
 
Ofgem concluded that there was weak 
consumer pressure on suppliers to behave 
competitively. In the absence of customer 
switching, the average domestic energy bill 
rose rapidly from £1095 in 2009 to £1232 to 
2012 [5]. One common tactic involved 
recruiting customers to fixed-term deals at 
a competitive market rate, then subtly 
transitioning customers to a more expensive 
standard variable tariff (SVT) when the term 
expired. More insidiously, the “Big Six” 
energy suppliers who controlled 99% of 
domestic customers at the time made 
concurrent price rise announcements, 
suggesting – though not entirely proving – 
collusion [2]. When viewed as a whole, the 
domestic retail energy market was distinctly 
uncompetitive. The finalisation of Ofgem’s 
Retail Market Review in 2013 and 
subsequent reforms represented a major 
regulatory intervention. It found that the 
domestic energy market was “characterized 
by weak competition between the incumbent 
suppliers arising from market segmentation 
and possible tacit coordination” [5]. Specific 
issues identified as hindering switching 
included complex tariffs, a lack of clear 
information about the tariffs, products and 
contract terms, and a lack of trust in dealing 
with suppliers [7]. Amongst the reforms put 
forth was a cap on the total number of tariff 
plans on offer by suppliers in an attempt to 
de-clutter the market. Additional reforms 
surrounding the presentation of information 
were also added to make tariff options 
transparent and easier to understand, 
including the creation of a standardised 
Tariff Comparison Rate and Tariff 
Information Label. Simultaneously, Ofgem 
also began developing a Confidence Code 
for switching services – particularly online 
price comparison websites – to create a 
standard that would inspire further trust in 
using such services to switch energy 
suppliers. 
 
The subsequent impact on switching rates 
suggested that the intervention was 
effective. After hitting a ten-year minimum 
in Q1 2013, electricity supplier switching 
rates halted their downward slope and 
climbed 50% by Q1 2016 [8]. The usage of 
price comparison websites – such as 
uSwitch and CompareTheMarket—which 
broadly advertised their adherence to 
Ofgem’s Confidence Code became a primary 
source for switching, as 47% who switched 
in 2015 used such services to compare plans 
[7]. Many of those switching also selected 
non-“Big Six” suppliers, eventually eroding 
their market share to around 87% [9]. While 
the impact was positive, the overall picture 
was still poor. Citing low consumer 
engagement relative to similar industries 
and a high penalty for “unengaged” 
consumers – an average £330 difference 
between their current supplier’s SVT and 
the fixed term deal with a competing 
supplier – the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) released a series of 
recommendations in 2016 intended to 
promote participation in the market [9].  
However, when exposed to further 
scrutiny, these statistics revealed a 
demonstrably uncompetitive 
environment – the consequences of 
which were realized over the next five 
years. 
Amongst these recommendations was the 
removal of the tariff cap and the creation of 
a database of contact information for 
customers who were on their supplier’s SVT 
for three consecutive years [9]. CMA 
concluded that the cap inhibited competition 
because, alongside other measures, it 
prevented the creation of innovative 
offerings. Testimony from the “Big Six” 
indicated that in response to the cap, they 
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removed green tariffs – which were among 
the least commercially viable offerings – and 
other tariff structures aimed at niche or less 
profitable market segments – such as low-
volume consumers [10]. Furthermore, 
suppliers also wanted the ability to offer 
reward plans paired with other services, 
discounted “smart home” packages, and 
more. Removal of the cap would allow for 
testing of new tariff plans which would 
theoretically enhance innovation in the 
sector.  
 
While many large and medium suppliers 
testified that the removal would be 
beneficial, it is difficult to fully reconcile this 
with the outcomes achieved previously 
under a market flooded with potential 
options. Conversely, the parallel 
recommendation for the creation of a 
database of “unengaged” customer 
information was poorly received. Many 
parties who felt that access to this database 
would only mean that suppliers, switching 
services, and other parties would inundate 
these consumers with junk mail, adding 
further dissatisfaction. 
 
The broad question looming over these 
recommendations is this: will this new 
intervention – which is essentially a negation 
of the previous one – bring about positive 
outcomes for the consumers? History 
suggests that this is not that case. From the 
business perspective, multiple opportunities 
now arise to prevent a regression to the 
previous state of affairs. No longer 
constrained by tariff caps, suppliers have 
the opportunity to create new tariff 
offerings, including the introduction of time-
based rates and products that take 
advantage of the smart-meter 
implementation. With an abundance of tariffs 
options available, price comparison websites 
could see increased demand as well. New 
services, such as the Cambridge-based 
AIswitch, that aim to deliver significant 
savings through automated identification and 
switching of energy plans with minimal 
customer involvement have a distinct 
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